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xmr-prerciccione opened pull request #1269: README: cleanups and updates
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xmr-pr
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ErCiccione[m]So, about the migration. We don't have many open issues, only 44. 19 of which are mine. If we don't find a quick way to transfer them i can just manually reopen all of them on github.
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ErCiccione[m]same for pull requests but easier. half are mine and the other half are abandoned or can be reopened on github
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ErCiccione[m]What about that?
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ErCiccione[m]luigi1111 could you give me triage permission on the github monero-site repo in the meantime? so i can clean up all those old issues
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luigi1111yes, soon
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UkoeHB_
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sarangGood point, considering that PDFs can be vectors for malware
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UkoeHB_How would I go about adding a checksum/signature for the ztm pdfs?
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sarangYou'd need to either sign them yourself and have your key added to the repo, or have someone else sign them
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sarangI also don't know if the PDFs are hosted on the same machine that serves the pages
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sarang(wouldn't matter if everyone checks signatures)
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sarangReproducible PDFs is a neat idea too
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sarangThen nobody needs to trust that you or the signer generated the PDF directly from source
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» sarang goes to look up information on reproducible PDFs from TeX
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UkoeHB_I imagine you'd need to specify version numbers for all packages
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sarangYeah probably need to build in a specific container to simplify things?
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sarangOr be lazy and simply offer the source for people to compile if they're concerned
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sarangIt's pretty straightforward compared to other builds :D
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UkoeHB_I'd be interested to hear of someone maliciously building ztm with alterations
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sarangI suppose the bigger threat is just replacing with a malware-laden PDF
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sarangNot one that's actually ZtM-like...
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sarangbut one that includes some malware payload
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sarangBut even so, signed hashes removes the possibility of any such situation