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.merge+ #2941 #2942 #2943

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moneromooo: could you take a look at this? monero-project/monero-gui #2943

you reviewed the first part of this PR a while ago and I would prefer a second approval

.merge- #2943

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I left a comment. Looks ok to me, but that's not saying much.

thanks

selsta should the hash thats checked come from two different locations? so web.getmonero.org/downloads/hashes.txt and then maybe github?

I think the current system is already overkill so adding the benefit of adding second location is negligible

the hash is worthless anyway without two signatures

kinghat[m]: using github would also mean the gui would ping github which they could use for tracking

guess you could check through tor or something

It would not add any security. If one maintainer gets fully compromised than they could replace both text files.

That’s why we added the second signature, two maintainers getting fully compromised is rather unlikely.

wouldnt github show a public trace of the compromise though?

not if you force-push and backdate the PR

s/PR/commit

it doesnt show publicly that you did that action today or is the public record derived from the changed date? like ya the commits date is this but you did it today, kind of thing.

don’t think it does

kinghat[m]: no it doesn't

it's easy to fake git data and to force-push it to a repo

^

the reason something like Monero isn't affected by that is because tons of people have a copy of the repo

and would notice a force push

but they wouldn't notice it any faster than noticing that the hashes had changed on the site

This is also where repro builds come into play

If you think that some other source host or builder is compromised, built it yourself and check

(and see that the git hashes differ too, if you're checking commits)

thanks for the education guys 🙏

.merge+ #2943

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.merges