09:22:48 <Inge-> sethsimmons: What has got you blue today?
09:31:58 <sethsimmons> Just constantly having to wade through countless numbers of shills, everyone and their sister trading stupid airdrops and risking money on stupid DeFi apps, shitty journalism almost universally in the space, people attacking legitimate projects like Monero to shill their shitcoin, etc etc
09:32:13 <sethsimmons> It’s a long list lol
09:32:30 <sethsimmons> I love Monero but good god is this space overall a crappy place
09:32:33 <sech1> Just a normal day in crypto
09:33:30 <sethsimmons> Yup
09:33:46 <dixie__flatline[> sethsimmons: you checked crypto twitter, didn't you?
09:36:22 <Inge-> sethsimmons: so.. nothing out of the ordinary,  in other words
09:36:53 <Inge-> hah. Going kyc -> non-kyc in btc-world: https://twitter.com/econoalchemist/status/1312490726316363776
09:50:39 <sethsimmons> <dixie__flatline[ "sethsimmons: you checked crypto "> I’m a regular part of it, hopefully for the better 😜
10:15:49 <dsc_> Inge-: lol.
10:15:58 <dsc_> just BTC things.
11:27:25 <artefact> i don't get the washer thing. there's only 50-ish bits of entropy in there?
14:14:52 <Inge-> hm. https://www.cozyit.com/french-bar-owners-arrested-for-offering-free-wifi-but-not-keeping-logs/
14:16:15 <moneromooo> That's due to East Germany reunification. Contrary to popular belief, the east won and subsumed pretty much the entire planet.
14:24:39 <sech1> lol, these "anti-terrorist" laws are so ridiculous. I can buy a wi-fi dish, point it at the nearest high-rise building and find 10-20 public networks
14:24:50 <sech1> literally in any major city
14:24:55 <asy> but wouldn't the bar's ISP be keeping the logs they need?
14:25:19 <sech1> bar's ISP would only see one IP in their logs
14:25:29 <sech1> bar owner has internal IP/MAC logs
14:26:33 <sech1> in Russia, not only they have to keep logs, but they also have to identify wi-fi users using mobile phone number
14:32:59 <nioc> moneromooo: <3
14:34:11 <asy> in the uk every public access point seems to ask for your phone # and email address, but never actually validates it
14:34:19 <asy> so i always use the details of people that i don't like, they can have all of the spam :P
15:57:03 <kayabaNerve> More of a general privacy question; while RingCTs, especially with the recent optimizations and work towards a log(n) ring sig construction, are amazing, how competent would stealth addresses + CTs be on their own? Amount privacy + guaranteed single use addresses.
15:57:19 <kayabaNerve> Just to protect the sender, I guess?
16:00:33 <moneromooo> You could link two outputs when spent together. You would know when every output is spent.
16:00:47 <moneromooo> So if Alice sends Bob an output, she will know when Bob spends it.
16:01:23 <moneromooo> She'll also know which other output(s) are Bob's if Bob spends them in the same tx as that output.
16:02:38 <moneromooo> I suspect that zero amount change outputs will become much less useful, since they'll never be spent, so Eve will be able to guess which outputs are 0 amount.
16:02:46 <moneromooo> And therefore which other outputs are self spends.
16:03:06 <moneromooo> That one will be probabilistic only, but as time grows, certainty grows too.
16:33:56 <kayabaNerve> True, but since you can't attach an ID to an output... though the fact you have UTXOs which requires merging/splitting does ruin this idea
16:34:24 <kayabaNerve> Eh. It still sounds decent, especially given the speed/complexity, but yeah, no where near RingCTs.
16:55:53 <artefact> "stealth addresses" are only for receiver anonymity. not sender
16:57:16 <Inge-> well, it has the upside that the sender "address" is also a stealth address
16:58:32 <kayabaNerve> Right. Again, I fully understand it's not privacy; just thinking it may be a decent first step
16:59:52 <Inge-> sure it makes things harder - but you can map the entire output graph/chain from a KYC exchange to wheverever the funds end up - including allowing the exchange to use chainalysis tools to see that after you withdrew, you sent coins to something they don't like, so they terminate your account.
17:00:31 <Inge-> but it would be harder to see - since they don't get a "tainted" destination address, they would need to somehow know that the destination was tainted
22:42:10 <agatha[m]> Hi guys, what is the most secure way to receive an online XMR payment from a company? Or would it be better to get BTC and then exchange them?
22:43:20 <selsta> receive?
22:43:34 <selsta> give the company a fresh subaddress?
22:44:48 <agatha[m]> So directly to the wallet? Or would it be safer to ask for BTC first?
22:45:12 <selsta> I don’t see how asking for BTC is safer.
22:45:36 <agatha[m]> Not to make aware the sender what I own.
22:46:01 <selsta> "What I own" <-- your balance?
22:46:05 <selsta> Or that you own Monero at all?
22:46:24 <agatha[m]> that I own Monero at all
22:46:54 <agatha[m]> I'm not sure if they can pay directly in Monero
22:47:05 <manifest> i suppose you cant have it sent to you if you cant have anyone know you own it
22:47:17 <manifest> including the people sending it to you, sounds weird tho
22:47:43 <agatha[m]> :)
22:49:15 <agatha[m]> So you can pay in XMR so that someone receives BTC via xmr.to but the other way around not.
22:57:29 <manifest> are xmr.to transactions impossible to recognize as originating from there
22:57:56 <agatha[m]> I don't know.
23:02:36 <manifest> i doubt they would make them so intentionally
23:02:56 <manifest> or possible to recognize