00:08:59 maybe is this the 2check " last_block_v1" on cryptonote_protocol_handler.inl 00:18:34 Come on... printf. std::cout. MGINFO. Any of those. 00:18:58 on !m_hardfork->check(bl) 02:31:08 I just realised my public key is different to my um, wallet address? 02:39:18 Your address is (mostly) your public keys, encoded as base58. 02:39:42 There's a prefix (magic byte), and a checksum to top it off. 02:55:26 gingeropolous: how did you solve the thing where people were sending you large files? 02:55:42 i didn't 02:55:48 well, i decided to host an ftp server 02:56:05 and then quickly discovered that i didn't know how to secure an ftp server 02:56:57 one of these nights i'll google my way through it 02:57:01 ya i need my buddy to send me a large file and going through the browser sucks ass and im not sure i want to setup an FTP server. not really sure what the options are. 02:57:26 is it all over linux etc? 02:57:37 you could create a user account and then he could scp it 02:57:39 nah hes on windows 02:57:50 im on nix 02:58:13 oh the internet. still can't send big files 03:32:24 what happened gingeropolous ? 03:32:44 with what? 03:32:53 your un-safu ftp server 03:33:22 oh nothin. aymptotically was able to log in and snoop around where he wernt sposed ta 03:33:43 haha 03:34:02 dont give him rights for sub dirs:D 03:34:25 did he see your hentai xxx collection? 03:35:03 maybe 03:36:26 F 03:46:13 Jason_, that's quite an eastern ISP, b'y! 03:46:17 :) 03:53:38 https://www.flickr.com/photos/188105686@N08 04:23:58 To send big files to numpties I usually upload to a google drive then email them a link, how big is big? 09:08:53 gingeropolous: To host ftp, check out /etc/ssh/sshd_config, chroot and sftp-server 17:27:55 are connections between nodes encrypted? E.g. can your ISP see the data being communicated between nodes? 17:30:06 No, yes. 17:32:01 okay, that's what I understood. Is there any private way then to broadcast a transaction? e.g. how can you get a transaction out without being seen as a node that actually is holding funds? 17:32:28 Host your node on a tor exit node, or with i2p. 17:32:32 Barf. 17:32:37 Host your node on a tor hidden service, or with i2p. 17:32:54 it would seem that being the first node to broadcast a transaction would leak you as a holder of value. 17:33:00 There are instructions in ANONYMITY_NETWORKS.md. 17:33:37 moneromooo: thx. then you need to have an ISP that doesn't about I2P or Tor 17:33:50 you can hide your tor usage with things like obfsproxy 17:33:58 it's so sad that the internet wasn't built with anonymity at the base later 17:34:02 *layer 17:34:18 Your ISP doens't see any amounts fwiw. It just sees a new tx. 17:34:31 moneromooo: yes, understood. 17:35:50 moneromooo: it should be possible to encrypt gossip between nodes, no? I mean just publish a public key on first connect? then subsequent communications back could be encrypted for you? 17:36:06 maybe would slow the network too much? 17:36:27 Yes, yes, yes, not sure. 17:36:37 My first SSL patch actually did this. 17:36:47 (opportunistic SSL between nodes) 17:37:37 Since you're connecting to random nodes though, it only protects against passive adversaries. MITM is undetected (unless you store known keys for daemons, but when they restart they change node id so...) 17:39:33 moneromooo: agreed. however, the passive adversary protection would be great, since a lot of parties likely 'just don't want to know about it', but you are right it does suffer from a big drawback. 17:40:41 better than nothing 17:41:39 In an advanced scheme, you could do something like this: store the keys. When starting up, check how many have changed their keys. Ask those who haven't what they think their keys are. If they differ, then someone is lying. 17:41:49 not sure where you'd go from there though. It seems like a can of worms. 17:42:21 Interesting idea, though a straightforward impl seems open to DoS. 17:42:50 yeah it's everything but simple 17:42:59 80-20 principle 17:43:07 you get 80% of the results by eager encryption 17:43:28 maybe eke out an additional 10% by connecting through a Tor exit node, and outsourcing the dirty work of checking for MITM to the Tor project? 17:44:39 is there a doc or github issue i should look at in regards to the latest on Tor vs I2P in monero in general? current state of affairs and where we are headed, etc. 17:47:25 ANONYMITY_NETWORKS.md 17:49:16 an idea for making surrounding node attack sybils more difficult 17:49:26 set a latency threshold for say 10% of nodes 17:49:39 for example, 3ms 17:49:48 now the attacker has to set up shop in the city as you 17:52:16 one question about the ring signature. what is the block_no of the sender ? 17:53:18 on blockchair.com for instance when I search a transaction hash I see several sender public keys and 2 recipient stealth keys i guess 17:53:37 and every senders public key has a block_no ? 17:54:11 It's probably "which block was this output created from". 17:54:23 ie, when the tx creating it got mined. 17:57:42 so its the block number from which the output is creating from, no matters how many times the monero were sent back and forth ? 17:58:52 Monero is not really sent back and forth. A transaction marks some key images as spent, and creates new outputs. 17:59:59 moneromooo: thanks for the doc, what the best way to get a starting anonymity node to start, is there a community maintained list somewhere atm? 18:00:24 How come it doesn't use Tor by default? 18:00:56 A simple approach for Tor is to just don't do any syncing. Claim the time is 1970-01-01, send your txn, and close the connection. If you don't see it within N seconds, try again 18:01:33 (bonus points: sometimes connect to random nodes over Tor and send garbage) 18:01:48 you could try telling your daemon to not publish the transaction, and then publish it manually to a public node using tor 18:02:00 well that's what I want, but not manual 18:04:00 It's great to be a coder. You want some piece of software to do something, you just do it. 18:04:27 OK, I wouldn't do that on FF or GCC, mind. 18:05:03 Actually, I did hack on FF a bit. But not GCC IIRC. 18:05:21 So. You want more tor use, grab your editor :) 18:09:09 I already have read and seen some information about the weakness of monero, beside the IP leaking is there any other possibility to leak someones sender address to the recipient address ? for instance if I buy monero on exchange and send 111 monero to a stealth address, the exchange just knows my stealth address and there is nowhere stored that an address on monero received just 111 monero, right ? 18:09:32 Wat 18:09:47 What do you call stealth address ? 18:09:58 Oh, do you mean subaddress maybe ? 18:10:01 normal monero receiving address ? 18:10:25 Well, if you give Alice your address, obviously Alice knows your address. She can't find it on the chain though. 18:10:41 She knows the tx she sent you, she can find it on the chain. 18:10:54 but alice just knows a 1 time address she can use to send me the monero ? 18:11:10 If you use a subaddress, yes. 18:11:48 !torrent 18:11:48 nonie: magnet:?xt=urn:btih:df21bf0cefcd09c4a9f2b37e9515dc9c00be14fc&dn=monero-all-v0.15.0.5&tr=http0x0p+00.0000000.000000tracker.opentrackr.org0x0p+013370.000000announce 18:11:57 !verify 18:11:57 the subaddress feature is the create new address function in monero gui right ? 18:11:57 nonie: gpg --verify hashes.txt && sha256sum -c hashes.txt 18:12:16 Very likely. 18:12:42 i am asking because in monero gui, there is also a create new account function 18:12:53 but i think thats something else 18:14:14 Lookup the difference on monero.stackexchnage.com. 18:19:30 So if I receive various inputs to the same monero account, and then i make an output, then in the blockchain you will see the last block-number from which I got input into this account will be seen ? 18:20:43 so ie. alice send me 3 transactions, block number 100,1000 and 10000. then i make a transaction to bob, the last block-number shown from me is 10000 ? 18:22:54 If getmonero.org is down you can download the binaries via torrent here. 1GB of data. 18:23:55 No. Well, you *might*, but it's unlikely. 18:26:18 why not? 18:34:15 nonie, what do you mean by "1GB of data" 18:36:14 The torrent contains binaries for all OS/platform. So it piles up. monero-all-v.15.0.5 18:36:24 ^- @ gingeropolous 18:36:30 oh sheisse 18:36:45 XD 18:37:19 well, i hope yah keep it up to date :) 18:37:41 I try. - I'm a bit lasy from time to time. 18:38:50 nobody here willing to sell some monero in exchange for bitcoins ? 18:39:44 are they clean? :P 18:40:05 I'm curious how come there are no miners who operate "laundry services" 18:40:23 for bitcorn? 18:40:32 @gingeropolous yes 18:40:37 yes 18:40:51 yeah just giving you virgin coins 18:41:16 yeah, i dunno. 18:41:29 those events should be detectable on the blockchain 18:41:47 what do you mean with detectable ? 18:41:51 blocks mined with a massive blockreward, transactions with massive fees 18:42:15 The mining pools could operate as laundry service. The miners get paied with tainted Bitcoin and the mining pool sells the freshly minted Bitcoin to coinmarketcap with a royalty. 18:42:35 on the bitcoin blockchain. you have dirty corn, you make a tx with a massive fee, pool mines the tx, then sends that fee back to you 18:43:19 If you make a tx, you (usually) use 11 outputs per ring. N rings per tx (N usually is 2, but can be 1 to many). If you pick the last output you received, it'll be one of the ones referenced by that tx. So 1/22, typically. If you pick anohter one, the last output will be referenced with a very small probability (if it's picked as a fake out). 18:43:25 oh or that, nonie. that'd work too 18:43:31 gingeropolous: Yeah but they don't know how many 18:43:40 Is there a torrent for a mostly-full chain too ? 18:43:42 @gingeropolous sounds genious 18:43:47 If you include 10% of tainted txns then that just kills chainalysis completely 18:44:05 i doubt miners wanna get paid in tainted coins though 18:44:48 moneromooo, i know there used to be in the past, seeded by a random effort of people 18:44:57 but yes, some chainanalyses slaves will proably check it and then miners will be investigated 18:44:57 moneromooo: No. Sorry. I would love to but i don't have the hdd's. 18:45:30 If you'd get a good chunk of the miners to go along with it, it would entirely kill chainalysis' business model. 18:46:08 On that note, I wonder how come nobody – I am not suggesting anything be done – has considered a Jim Bell-style system for such. They're hated and have caused people with money countless woes. 18:47:41 miners following this business model might land into same shitlist 18:48:14 Lots of shady miners out there. And you can just rent hashing power. 18:48:34 e.g. on NiceHash. When they see the price going up, some of the pools will switch.