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geonic
just came across this. has anyone looked at this paper?
link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-51280-4_31
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sech1
"We show that Monero’s network is highly centralized—13.2% of the nodes collectively maintain 82.86% of the network connections."
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sech1
That's not a definition of "centralized"
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sech1
They've never heard of 80-20 law, have they?
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geonic
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geonic
doubt it's anything revolutionary but might have some interesting tidbits. haven't read it yet.
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gingeropolous
i wonder if peers share their active connections, if it could be programmed so a node would try to maintain at least 2 hops between its peers
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gingeropolous
that might mitigate the effect of ppl that set their cnxn limits to like 9k
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gingeropolous
or again we introduce hash for p2p
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gingeropolous
because nodes are incentivized to be super connected, so they hear the newest block info etc.
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gingeropolous
or you get 8 cnxns for free, but for every peer after that, you have to perform n PoW every x hours
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hyc
sounds like you're trying to fight the law of large numbers
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gingeropolous
well every measure designed into anything is to prevent things from drifting to equilibria that are unsustainable
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gingeropolous
and sweeping generalizations are awesome
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hyc
anyway, it's not something you can enforce, anyone can compile their own node with no connection limis
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gingeropolous
unless its enforced by POW
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gingeropolous
i mean poW
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trashpanda[m]
👋I am catching up with all the new ring signature research that's been done lately, and it seems like much of the key work is based on the Groth et.al. one-out-of-many proof scheme for using very large rings. Most of these have amazing batch verification performance if proofs use a common ring... Which leads to my question:
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trashpanda[m]
Is anyone aware of good resources for how independent users can select large shared rings without hurting their privacy? It seems like ring selection is a non-trivial task if we want massive shared rings
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Inge-
sounds like something sarang could comment on
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sarang
There are a lot of things to consider there
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sarang
You need to ideally account for ring member age, adversarial miner behavior, previous output structure...
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sarang
Miller et al. discuss some of this in their original paper
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trashpanda[m]
Which paper is that? Seems like I have more reading to do yet 😄
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sarang
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trashpanda[m]
Thanks!
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trashpanda[m]
All of these "large ring" signature schemes are blowing my mind. Great work!
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sarang
Lots of interesting work in that area
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sarang
Especially seeing how both the Bulletproofs and Groth/Kohlweiss proving systems can be used
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sarang
Will be away for a few hours... sarangcat needed dental work :(