16:36:31 unsedd, do you know of any GPU accelerated fuzzing? 16:39:18 Fuzzing doesn't seem like the kind of thing that'd benefit from that. 17:18:12 Hey everybody and @sgp_ 17:19:29 Today I've been thinking about this notion of all-coinbase transactions, so that you know funds came from *_a_* miner, but you don't know *_which_* miner 17:20:04 I can't recall, has the decoy selection algorithm for these all-coinbase transactions been discussed? 17:23:17 Could just use timing from the standard algo, but I'm wondering if anybody has intuition about what the coinbase spend time distribution might look like. 17:28:06 s/know/statistically suspect/ 17:28:06 Isthmus meant to say: Today I've been thinking about this notion of all-coinbase transactions, so that you statistically suspect funds came from *_a_* miner, but you don't know *_which_* miner 17:29:25 Isthmus: https://medium.com/@JEhrenhofer/lets-stop-using-coinbase-outputs-da672ca75d43 17:30:35 I continue to advocate for a separate selection algo for coinbase output spends 17:42:00 Idk if you'd gain much from a new distribution, since most coin base are probably pool payouts. Those are easily identifiable regardless of distribution 17:43:11 UkoeHB_: did you read the post? I adocate for normal transactions never selecting coinbase outputs as decoys 17:45:29 Users never spend coinbase outputs 17:45:36 Isthmus is wondering about the ring member selection if coinbase were isolated 17:46:31 Best way would be to pick clusters from other pools (or your own pool), but that's pretty hard/annoying to implement and maintain 17:50:53 Yeah, for this thought experiment, let's say that we're not changing the protocol but pools are voluntarily adopting best practices for mixing their coinbases. In that case, what decoy selection algorithm should they use 17:53:57 Aren't the public pools indifferent? 17:54:16 Thought experiment 17:54:19 They publish all their payouts and blocks mined anyway 17:54:50 Yea, I wanna get away from that model though. 17:55:47 It matters for the change outputs though. Those can be improved by selecting decoys sent to miners in the same transaction that the change output was generated in 17:58:09 I don't want to publish blocks and transactions though. Instead of publish all of the blocks and transactions, will just publish an exchange rate between hashes & xmr payout. 17:58:56 Instead of every individual miner auditing the whole pool, each just audits their own contribution and payout 17:59:05 And if they feel that the ratio is unfair, they go elsewhere 18:00:05 is it possible to audit ex-ante when everything is published? 18:00:17 i.e. would changing the audit procedure not be neutral? 18:02:05 Not sure if I get what you're asking. 18:03:48 Any pool can choose whatever audit procedure they want, and users can choose whichever pool uses the one they like. 18:03:56 I dont fully understand pools. Does publishing everything mean a prospective miner can audit payouts before mining anything, or do they have to earn payouts first? If the latter, then changing the audit method to be exchange-rate based would be neutral for miners. 18:08:07 I think that's the principle? Looking at https://supportxmr.com/ now 18:08:13 In the bottom right you can click to see 2 lists 18:08:16 1) all of the blocks they mined 18:08:20 2) all of they miner payouts 18:08:22 My thought is pools are unlikely to adopt anything that loses them a competitive edge against other miners, such as possible better auditing 18:08:46 s/other miners/other pools 18:08:47 UkoeHB_ meant to say: My thought is pools are unlikely to adopt anything that loses them a competitive edge against other pools, such as possible better auditing 18:09:02 What does an honest pool have to lose from better auditing? 18:09:41 Note better doesn't mean able to catch more. Better means privacy preserving 18:11:11 I mean weaker auditing 18:13:59 idk what you gain from publishing this stuff, since it could all be faked.. 18:14:11 or partially faked 18:15:58 Are you talking about publishing all the blocks and transactions? 18:16:05 yah 18:32:21 Yea, even putting aside reliability of self-reported blocks and payouts... I think that the publish-everything-so-everybody-can-verify approach makes a lot of sense for Bitcoin and the transparency=auditability ethos of many cryptocurrencies. But the paradigm isn't great for privacy coins (especially with decoy based privacy) 18:32:33 Imagine that you go to the gas station and want to know whether your interaction with the pump is fair. Do you ask the owner how many gallons of gas they sold in the last 30 days and how much total profit they brought in? 18:32:41 Nah, in that context, my notion of fair is whether the amount I am charged matches the price on the sign multiplied by the volume of gas I received. 18:58:14 Your point makes sense if you're OK doing the transaction before checking. Keep in mind that you don't have a "cancel" option once you're chared. 18:58:17 charged. 19:01:18 This is one of those situations where I think having data from transparent chains could be useful 19:01:56 e.g. data on spend ages for coinbase outputs only, to get a sense of differences from overall spend patterns