00:34:53 <mnt_grrrl> test
01:53:05 <xmrmatterbridge> <agentpatience> test ok.
03:16:10 <one-horse-wagon> Seems like running a full node works best when I use my own list that bans all TOR nodes.  Black hats love to hide behind TOR.
05:35:15 <selsta> .merges
05:35:16 -xmr-pr- 7248 7266 7267 7272 7278
05:35:40 <selsta> .merge- 7272
05:35:41 <xmr-pr> Removed
05:38:40 <selsta> .merge+ 7281 7282
05:38:41 <xmr-pr> Added
06:20:28 <fluffypony> kayabaNerve: I tend to agree with mooo - there is precious little documentation around Monero's inner workings, the truth really is in the code
06:20:47 <fluffypony> someone working on an alt implementation will need to literally keep tabs on every single PR and then figure out if it's something that has to be ported
06:20:52 <fluffypony> it's a LOT of effort
07:04:00 <kayabaNerve> fluffypony: Yep
07:12:46 <hyc> that's how copy protction works in open source :P
07:49:13 <kayabaNerve> hyc: Except you can just fork the node :P Not too hard to copy
09:12:07 <mj-xmr> "that's how copy protction works in open source :P" <-- bang on. I think that the value lies in human resources and in the ability to attract new productive members.
09:12:51 <mj-xmr> I was attracted because of switching to CPU mining and a working CCS system. I'm fed up with working for free.
09:13:00 <mj-xmr> But everybody has his own story I guess.
09:14:22 <mj-xmr> And regarding CPU mining - I also observed how the dynamics of BTC works. It's unsustainable. Mining BTC is only profitable at certain moments of the cycle. After the cycle, you may as well trash the ASIC miner, as it's of no use anymore.
09:14:52 <mj-xmr> So I though, that if anything prevails, it's the CPU oriented coins, and this is where I want to invest my time.
09:15:21 <mj-xmr> With Monero being the biggest one plus private. It's a matter of time until the public realizes it.
09:17:08 <mj-xmr> The only thing that could break it, is quantum computing, but this is for now a buzzword for me, rather than anything else.
09:38:24 <Inge-> I saw some claims that you need like 20 million qubits to break the cryptography
09:38:39 <Inge-> still up in the air if that is even remotely feasible
09:46:05 <mj-xmr> Inge-: Correct me if I'm wrong. Do you mean specifically "the current state of cryptography"? Can't we simply increase the number of bits of our algos if the processing power makes a leap?
09:54:10 <Inge-> My knowledge here is very shallow, but AFAIK yes, you can delay by adding bits. But it is hard to retroactively add bits to existing transactions on public ledgers.
10:24:02 <janowitz> Inge-: There has been a recent paper by MRL on the topic... https://github.com/insight-decentralized-consensus-lab/post-quantum-monero/blob/master/writeups/technical_note.pdf
10:24:28 <janowitz> For those who prefer video content, also an interview with the authors: https://www.monerotalk.live/post-quantum-monero-update
10:25:49 <mj-xmr> Thanks!
10:28:38 <TomTom33> Hi
17:34:56 <Isthmus> Lol @Inge- “But it is hard to retroactively add bits to existing transactions on public ledgers.” < yep
17:34:56 <Isthmus> Anyways, from a cryptographic perspective, adding more bits only helps in some cases.
17:34:56 <Isthmus> For attacks that involve Grover’s algorithm, its ability to find an input scales with O(N^1/2) so doubling the key size is a decent way to buy some time. :- )
17:34:56 <Isthmus> However, the most likely & low hanging attacks on Monero’s cryptography would utilize Shor’s algorithm, which can factor large numbers and break the discrete log problem. In this case, adding more bits is NOT a robust way to increase security, because the task is a problem that is not “hard” (in the technical sense) for quantum computers.
17:34:56 <Isthmus> It’s important to remember that quantum computers have paradigmatically-different abilities, and are not simply bigger or faster versions of current technology. The difference between a traditional computer and a quantum computer is analogous to the difference between a typewriter and a laptop. Sure, both can be used to take notes during a meeting, but a laptop can carry out functions (e.g. video editing) that a
17:34:56 <Isthmus> typewriter fundamentally cannot.
17:34:56 <Isthmus> So to mitigate those attack surfaces, instead of key size escalation, it’s necessary to switch to cryptography based on other mechanisms that fall into classes of problems that are “hard” for a quantum computer (e.g. shortest vector problem is hard for both classical & quantum computers)
17:42:54 <selsta> Snipa: luigi1111w: we would need merges again :)
17:43:03 <luigi1111w> .merges
17:43:03 -xmr-pr- 7248 7266 7267 7278 7281 7282
17:43:10 <luigi1111w> energizer bunnies I tell ya
18:10:52 <Inge-> Isthmus: <3
19:05:50 <selsta> please also cli afterwards we need merges due to some conflict :P
19:39:53 <Valdim6606> “I thought, ‘I’m going to pump it and dump it,’ because I was interested and taking the ideas and implementing them in bitcoin. The bitcoin code base was far more interesting to me than monero, and I thought, ‘I’m not going to work on this codebase, it’s terrible,'” he recalls - fluffypony on Monero
19:39:54 <Valdim6606> jess: You need to save fluffypony's honor urgently ^^
21:07:16 <mj-xmr> Thanks for the comments.
21:07:29 <mj-xmr> on the testing parallelism.