01:24:54 "give all hosts the same chance of being picked for connecting" 01:25:15 does this mean if someone runs multiple nodes on one IP they don’t have an advantage anymore? 02:06:32 Yes. 02:33:54 luigi1111: can you ban this person from the repo? https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/6940#issuecomment-717651602 02:33:57 keeps spamming 03:24:51 done 04:43:30 moneromooo: we are going to add these, tag, and release into the into the wild https://git.wownero.com/wownero/wownero/compare/master...wowario:buttholes 04:44:18 any other commits we should cherry-pick? 07:45:39 .merges 07:45:40 -xmr-pr- 6886 11:44:03 wowario[m]: the full list is 6933 6935 6936 6939 6940 6942 6943 11:44:23 The dropping/banning is very slow though, you might want to increase it. 12:44:11 there are ~90 peers on wow network, by how much should I increase it? 12:47:36 are you referring to DROP_PEERS_ON_SCORE? 12:48:44 or context.m_score (5)? 12:52:57 DROP_PEERS_ON_SCORE and score decrease by 5. 12:53:09 DROP_PEERS_ON_SCORE is 10 IIRC, which means you need two fails to drop. 12:53:50 The more out peers you have on a node, the less likely it is each peer is tested. Monero has 12 atm. 12:53:50 DROP_PEERS_ON_SCORE -2 12:54:19 Ah, right, so a failure drops score by 1, takes two failures to drop the connection. 12:54:51 When it drops, it increases hte ban score by 5, and the peer gets banned at 10. 12:55:02 So 4 fails in total to get banned. 12:55:48 we've increase P2P_DEFAULT_CONNECTIONS_COUNT to 12 12:56:54 change DROP_PEERS_ON_SCORE to -5? 12:57:36 https://git.wownero.com/wownero/wownero/pulls/341/files 12:58:22 That'd drop them even less. You want -1 if you want to test more aggressively. 12:58:48 And replace 5 with 10 in the "drop_connection_with_score" call. 12:58:55 Then a single fail should ban. 12:58:59 Which is a bit harsh. 13:08:31 https://git.wownero.com/wownero/wownero/commit/38b9be84f2f1d1d3a9ccb6bd6869091bf8da29de 13:13:24 is logging thorough for these new functions? running on wownero network will help determine false positive rate - just off the cuff, i doubt wownero is being actively spied on / attacked. 13:13:56 so i guess i mean logging regarding ability to see which peers are getting banned 13:14:56 wownero also has a longer blocktime though. dunno how that factors in 13:16:32 5 min blocktime 13:19:36 The longer the block time, the slower peers are tested. 13:22:52 For logs, you grep for waiting\|bad\ peer (INFO level). 13:47:12 hrm, how can we mimic the attack? would running a node with --no-sync do it? 13:50:33 No. 14:00:58 could you add a monero AHP as a wownero peer? if the protocol is the same or similar enough 14:02:07 Doubt they'll oblige, given they're malicious in the first place. 14:03:13 what prevents the spy nodes from relaying blocks though? 14:03:32 Nothing. It just makes them conspicuous, which is odd. 14:03:45 Now they'll start hiding. 14:05:12 Occam's razor says they just could rent those boxes cheaper :) 14:26:02 wowario[m]: another you might want: 6944 14:31:08 -xmr-pr- moneromooo-monero opened pull request #6944: protocol: drop peers which repeatedly don't reply to chain requests 14:31:08 -xmr-pr- > https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/6944 16:35:28 14:13 is logging thorough for these new functions? running on wownero network will help determine false positive rate - just off the cuff, i doubt wownero is being actively spied on / attacked. <-- I did test for false positives on monero network and did not have a single peer have their score decreased in 12+ hours 16:36:17 so looks good, the 20 seconds waiting time is quite generous, usually blocks are relayed in less than a second 16:41:23 I had a fluffy block from a peer 1.5 minutes after everyone else. Shit happens from time to time. 16:42:12 right, not saying we should decrease the 20 seconds 16:42:25 btw I did a transaction this morning and it got relayed only after ~2 minutes, is this normal? 16:42:33 I have 64 peers out/20-30 in usually 16:42:35 normal? 16:42:51 Isn't 2 minutes too slow for tx propagation? 16:42:59 dandelion? 16:43:13 yes 16:43:15 all these spy nodes drop transactions so yes it is normal currently 16:43:32 I banned spy nodes, but I guess next node in the chain didn't 16:43:58 yep 16:44:20 so we have to put out a release soon and hope that many upgrade 16:44:29 plus manually ban them from as many nodes as possible 16:44:43 which reduce how often they show up in peer lists 16:44:51 should reduce* 18:46:08 -xmr-pr- MoneroArbo opened issue #6945: "Edit" and "Copy" buttons in Account and Receive tabs are not visible ... 18:46:08 -xmr-pr- > https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/6945 18:47:30 selsta: Perhaps it would be worthwhile to issue a mailing list message 18:54:57 selsta : there isn't much of a fix for what the user described. 2 minutes is within the expectation for dandelion++ timeout 18:55:42 or I see, if everyone bans spying nodes it would possibly improve 18:56:02 that seems to be the hope, but sounds unrealistic to me 18:56:13 yeah they'll likely react somehow 18:57:16 the current PRs - which I plan to comment on shortly (hopefully) - would force them to use more disk+memory+cache I/O, so there's less "asymmetric warfare" going on with the number of connections they have vs honest nodes 18:58:52 *they can support. although, dunno yet there are some moves around that too though 19:00:17 that sounds all promising. if fake nodes are forced to do as much work as real nodes anyway, we've succeeded. 19:01:42 not sure is that has any repelling effect. the work a node does is pretty negligable imo. at least cpu/io wise 19:09:37 I think measuring the time-to-fluff might be the way to go after that. A long time means one node along the way dropped it. Maybe not the first one you're connected to, but one of those it's connected to, or recursively. 19:10:12 Dropping the first one means that overall, if everyone's doing the same thing, *some node somewhere* will be dropping the bad one. 19:10:34 Then it won't drop it again, and other nodes should start accreting. 19:15:06 was thinking about that. Would have to think about leaking path information via timings of switching. Should be difficult to identify without active txes 19:17:29 Actually, it might drop it again, since the length of the stem phase is random, so it'd have to be a threshold. Do more than N% of the stem txes I sent this peer get unreasonably delayed ? 19:17:46 It might end up unstable. 19:37:29 oh sorry I zoomed through your message a bit since it was similar to my idea 19:37:49 I was thinking instead of dropping the peer, just "re-roll" the selection on which outbound peer is used 19:38:10 because the next hop might be legit, so its not a complete turnover on connection 19:39:13 you might be able to score against that, because the next hop shouldn't keep selecting the next peer, but I dunno 19:39:32 deviates from the algorithm a bit, I'll dig into what grin has been doing 19:46:08 -xmr-pr- moneromooo-monero opened pull request #6946: protocol: prefer cycling low score peers 19:46:08 -xmr-pr- > https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/6946 22:01:08 -xmr-pr- moneromooo-monero opened pull request #6947: add a convenience script to start monero with inbound tor 22:01:08 -xmr-pr- > https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/6947 22:03:03 gingeropolous: do you have a long lived hidden service monerod ? 22:14:10 (or anyone else) 22:14:33 mine is 22:15:52 Address ? 22:16:58 hm, lemme dig it up 22:17:53 2xmrnode5itf65lz.onion 22:17:55 ty 22:18:16 Port is 18083 ? 22:18:48 18081 22:19:58 Sorry, I meant P2P, that's RPC, is it ? 22:20:05 oh, yes rpc only 22:20:31 I could add p2p too I guess 22:20:47 why 18083? 22:20:49 (reason being 6947 above) 22:21:00 Because that's what's in the doc, so easier :) 22:21:10 ok lemme tweak torrc 22:21:17 I guess it's in the docs because it's the first one free after zmq. 22:24:08 ok try it 22:27:10 reminds me. we have --rpc-bind-port and --rpc-restricted-bind-port, but only --rpc-bind-ip 22:27:33 would be nice to have --rpc-restricted-bind-ip 22:27:57 then could keep unrestricted bind-port open on localhost, and restricted-bind-port open on 0.0.0.0 22:28:10 I think smeone proposed that too on Github 22:28:16 I remember there being an issue for it 22:28:27 and maybe ignore --confirm-external-bind on the latter, since it's restricted anyway 22:28:41 igonre: don't require 22:29:13 hm, looking at issues now 22:29:31 I seem to be connecting, but it's closing the connection, failing to handshake. 22:29:40 It's connecting fine to other tor nodes tohugh. 22:30:40 hmm 22:30:58 I've never tested p2p 22:31:09 anything useful we can turn on in logging from this side? 22:31:53 Oh, it connected now. Then complains about bad zone. Probably my fault here. 22:32:26 all I'm doing is having tor forward to localhost:18080 22:32:50 Oh, so it thinks it's on clearnet, then sending clearnet peers. 22:32:57 Explains. 22:33:05 what do I need to do instead? 22:33:16 https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/6947 has the steps :D 22:33:24 ok 22:33:25 They're from ANONYMITY_NETWORKS.md 22:34:04 Should be: --tx-proxy tor,127.0.0.1:9050,10 --anonymous-inbound 2xmrnode5itf65lz.onion:18083,127.0.0.1:18083,25 22:34:14 Tweak ports as necessary. 22:34:56 ok 22:36:54 ok try again 22:37:56 Works, thanks :) 22:40:07 hm, I didn't have that control socket stuff enabled in torrc. restarting tor again 22:42:34 ok, running again 22:45:33 ah found it, issue #6369